Homework and Labs are due ON THE DATE where the homework or lab is linked.

<table border=1> <th width=20>Date</th><th>Topic</th><th>Reading</th><th>Homework</th><th>Labs</th> <tr><tr> <th>Tues. 8-31</th> <td>Class Pedagogy and Policies</td> <td>Syllabus, Wikipedia: Problem-based learning, Multi-Agent Framework </td> <td> </td> <td> </td>

<tr> <th> Thurs. 9-2</th> <td> Choosing A Class Problem <br> Lecture Plan</td> <td> Wikipedia: Multi-agent System, Multiagent Systems introduction, Principles of Collective Animal Behavior, Ant simulation in STARLOGO, and fish schooling on YouTube. <br> For this and the next lecture, I'm not expecting mastery of the reading material, just an understanding of the fundamental kinds of problems that we can study.</td> <td> </td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th> Tues. 9-7</th> <td> Choosing a Class Problem, part 2 Lecture Plan 9-7</td> <td> Battle of the Wits, Asch Conformity Experiment part 1, Asch experiment part 2, Milgrim's Obedience Experiment, Task Allocation </td> <td>Problem Brainstorm</td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 9-9</th> <td>Utility Theory, Payoff Matrices, Extensive Form Games </td> <td>Section 3.1 (skipp Lemma 3.1.6), Section 3.2, Extensive Form Notes </td> <td>Refine Lab 1 Homework</td> <td> </td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 9-14</th> <td>Solution Concepts, Canonical Games</td> <td> Section 3.2, Section 3 through page 62, Section 3.4.1 pp. 72-73, Canonical Games Notes</td> <td>Payoff Matrix Homework</td> <td> </td>

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<th>Thurs. 9-16</th> <td>Finding Nash Equilibria for Simple Games: Indifference Points, Maximin Methods, Linear Programming</td> <td>Section 3.3.3, Section 4.1, Computing Mixed Strategies Notes, Section 7.2. Optional: Fictitious Play online notes </td> <td>Solution Concepts Homework</td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 9-21</th> <td>Nash's Theorem and Minimax Theorem</td> <td>Section 3.3.4 (skip proofs of Lemma 3.3.14, Theorem 3.3.17, and Corollary 3.3.21), pp. 73-74</td> <td> Annotated Nash Proof Homework</td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 9-23</th> <td>Review, Catch-Up, and Discuss Lab 1</td> <td></td> <td>Finding Solutions Homework Updated </td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th> Tues. 9-28 </th> <td>Repeated Play: Discounted reward, Trigger strategies, The Folk theorem</td> <td>Shoham pp. <s>147-157</s> 141-149 (through Theorem 6.1.9), Axelrod pp. 1-24</td> <td>Refine Lab 2 Homework</td> <td><s>Lab 1</s></td>

<tr> <th> Thurs. 9-30 </th> <td>Repeated Play: Automata and the repeated play Prisoner's Dilemma</td> <td>Axelrod Pages <s>25-54</s> 27-87, Notes on Axelrod's Theorems</td> <td>Annotated Axelrod Homework</td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 10-5</th> <td>The Replicator Dynamic</td> <td>Section 7.7, pp 224-230, stop at section 7.7.3. (Brian P. and Yisong G., read section 7.7.3)</td> <td></td> <td>Lab 1</td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 10-7</th> <td>Review and catch-up. Possibly Discrete replicator dynamics</td> <td></td> <td>Trigger Strategy Homework</td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 10-12</th> <td>No class — Mike Travel</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 10-14</th> <td>No class — Mike Travel</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 10-19</th> <td>Evolution of Social Structure</td> <td>Skyrms 1-47</td> <td></td> <td>Lab 2</td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 10-21</th> <td>Evolution of Social Structure</td> <td>Skyrms 1-47 continued …, Exam 1 Review</td> <td>Lab 3 refinement homework</td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 10-26</th> <td>Exam 1</td> <td>EXAM SCHEDULE</td> <td></td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 10-28</th> <td>Exam 1 continued …</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 11-2</th> <td>Evolution of Social Structure</td> <td>Skyrm's pages 45-81</td> <td></td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 11-4</th> <td>Sumpter's Principles Revisited</td> <td>Principles of Collective Animal Behavior</td> <td>Sumpter Homework</td> <td>Lab 3</td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 11-9</th> <td><s>Social Choice and Voting</s></td> <td><s>Shoham pp. 241-254 (I hate to do this, but please skip the proofs)</s></td> <td>Lab 4 Proposals</td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 11-11</th> <td>Social Choice and Voting</td> <td>Shoham pp. 241-254 (I hate to do this, but please skip the proofs)</td> <td></td> <td></td>

<tr><tr> <tr> <th>Tuess. 11-16</th> <td>Mechanism Design</td> <td>Wikipedia on Mechanism Design, Shoham pp. 261-271 <s>261-273</s></td> <td>Voting Homework</td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 11-18</th> <td>Auctions and Mechanism Catch-up</td> <td>Shoham pp 315-327</td> <td></td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 11-23</th> <td>No Class – Friday Instructional Schedule</td> <td></td> <td>Auction Homework</td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 11-25</th> <td>No Class – Thanksgiving</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 11-30</th> <td>Asynchronous Dynamic Programming, LRTA*, and Moving Target Search</td> <td>Shoham pp20-23, Ishida pp 35-44, A* Review</td> <td></td> <td>Lab 4</td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 12-2</th> <td>No Class – work on your project presentations</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>

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<tr> <th>Tues. 12-7</th> <td>Catch-up and Final Exam Review <br><s>Multiagent Learning Overview</s></td> <td><s>Appendix C, Shoham section 7.4-7.5</s></td> <td></td> <td></td>

<tr> <th>Thurs. 12-9</th> <td>Final Project Presentations</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Class Project</td>

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<tr> <th>12/13-12/17 </th> <td>Final Exam in my office</td> <td>Final Exam Schedule</td> <td></td> <td></td>

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